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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







OTHMANE OUADAH,  
                             Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                              Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER  
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A079 733 409) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 16, 2010 
______________ 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 







GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 
 Othmane Ouadah (“Ouadah” or “Petitioner”) appeals from a decision of the Board 
  
2 
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to remand.1  Since the BIA did not 
abuse its discretion in denying this motion, we will affirm the BIA‟s decision.   
I.  Background 
 We write solely for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential facts. 
 Ouadah, a native and citizen of Algeria, entered the United States on September 
16, 1994, as a non-immigrant visitor.  He was granted an extension of his visa allowing 
him to stay in the United States until September 15, 1995.  He overstayed his visa.  The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service
2
 issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging 
Ouadah with being removable, pursuant to § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), on January 9, 2003.  The NTA ordered 
Ouadah to appear for a hearing on February 18, 2004.  (Admin. R. 716-18.) 
 After several continuances, the IJ held a hearing on May 5, 2008.  (Admin. R. 132-
                                                 
1
  Ouadah does not appeal the BIA‟s dismissal of his appeal from the Immigration Judge‟s 
(“IJ”) decision denying his motion for a continuance and denying his application for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”).  In fact, Ouadah concedes that the request for asylum is presumptively time-
barred and not subject to review before this Court.  (Br. of the Pet‟r 1 n.1.) 
 
2
  On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist as an 
independent agency within the Department of Justice and its functions were transferred to 
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security and placed under the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See Homeland Security Act, 116 Stat. 2135, 
Pub. L. 107-296 (2002).  For the sake of simplicity, because relevant events occurred 
both before and after that change, we will refer to the Bureau of Immigrations and 





93.)  At that hearing, the government offered to allow Ouadah to voluntarily depart the 
country.  Ouadah initially accepted this offer, but, prior to the IJ entering an appropriate 
order, Ouadah changed his mind, and sought to pursue his application for asylum, 
withholding of removal and relief under the CAT.  Upon completion of Ouadah‟s 
testimony, the IJ continued the proceedings to issue his decision.  On May 15, 2008, 
before the IJ issued his decision, Ouadah again changed his mind and opted to withdraw 
his application for relief and accept the government‟s offer of voluntary departure.  
(Admin. R. 194-203.)  The hearing was continued to allow the government to consider 
reinstating the offer.  At a hearing on May 21, 2008, the government confirmed that the 
offer was still available.  (Admin. R. 204-08.)  Ouadah withdrew his application for 
relief, and the IJ continued the hearing to November 12, 2008.  At that time, the IJ 
proposed the entry of an order of voluntary departure.  The November 12th hearing was 
continued until November 24, 2008. 
 On November 24, 2008, Ouadah appeared before the IJ.  (Admin. R. 209-18.)  
Instead of proceeding with issuance of the order of voluntary departure, Ouadah sought to 
substitute counsel, continue the proceedings, and reinstate his application for relief.  The 
continuance was based upon an alleged change in circumstances; namely, the August 21, 
2008 attack on Ouadah‟s brother.3  In support of the motion, Ouadah submitted his 
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   In Ouadah‟s original affidavit, he refers to the attack having occurred in November 
2008.  (Admin. R. 681.)  Subsequently, he, and his family members, state in affidavits 
  
4 
affidavit (Admin. R. 680-81), and his counsel proffered that if the continuance was 
granted, affidavits from family members and medical records from the brother‟s 
treatment would be provided (Admin. R. 213-14).  The IJ granted the motion to substitute 
counsel but denied the request to continue, noting that Ouadah did not present “any 
material change in circumstances that would suggest that the respondent should be able to 
reinstate his application.”  (Admin. R. 50.)  The IJ then ordered Ouadah removed.   
 Ouadah appealed to the BIA.  Before the BIA, Ouadah conceded that the IJ found 
that he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought.  (Admin. R. 17.)  
Based on that concession, the BIA dismissed Ouadah‟s appeal of the denial of the motion 
for a continuance as moot.  The BIA also denied Ouadah‟s motion to remand,4 stating 
that “there is no indication that the information was previously unavailable.”  (Admin. R. 
3.)  Specifically, the BIA expressed concern that Ouadah offered no reason as to why the 
affidavits from his mother and sister, dated November 4, 2008, and the medical records, 
dated August 21, 2008, were not available at the time of the hearing before the IJ on 
November 24, 2008.  (Id.) 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the attack occurred on August 21, 2008.  (Admin. R. 31, 33, 37.)  The medical 




 The BIA treated Ouadah‟s appeal as (1) an appeal from the decision of the Immigration 
Judge finding him removable, denying his request for a continuance, and ordering him 
removed and (2) a motion to remand.  Although Ouadah did not specifically file a motion 
to remand, the BIA treated the appeal as a motion to remand based on the affidavits 




 Ouadah now seeks review of the BIA‟s denial of his motion to remand.   
II.  Jurisdiction 
 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.   We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review final orders of the BIA.  Kucana 
v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827 (2010). 
III.  Standard of Review
5
 
 “We review the BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, and 
review its underlying factual findings related to the motion for substantial evidence.  The 
BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen may only be reversed if it is „arbitrary, irrational, or 
contrary to law.‟”  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Lu v. 
Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001); quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 
170 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
IV.  Analysis 
 “The Supreme Court has identified three principal grounds on which the 
Immigration Judge or the Board may deny a motion to reopen immigration proceedings. 
First, it may hold that the movant has failed to establish a prima facie case for the relief 
sought . . . . Second, it may hold that the movant has failed to introduce previously 
unavailable, material evidence that justifies reopening, as required by regulation.  Third, 
                                                 
5  “[F]or purposes of jurisdiction we treat a motion to remand as a motion to reopen.  We 
consider these devices as equivalent for jurisdictional and standard of review purposes.”  
Kortynyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
  
6 
in „cases in which the ultimate grant of relief [being sought] is discretionary (asylum, 
suspension of deportation, and adjustment of status, but not withholding of deportation),‟ 
the Board can „leap ahead . . . over the two threshold concerns (prima facie case and new 
evidence/reasonable explanation) and simply determine that even if they were met, the 
movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.‟”  Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 
169-70 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988), and citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) 
(currently numbered as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c))).  These three grounds are independent of 
each other.  Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104.  Further, both this Court and the Supreme Court of 
the United States have emphasized that motions to reopen in immigration proceedings are 
disfavored.  See, e.g., id. at 107; Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d at 171-72. 
 Here, the BIA concluded that Ouadah had not provided any explanation as to why 
the evidence introduced before the BIA was previously unavailable.  Ouadah argues 
before this Court that the fact the affidavits from his mother and sister were dated prior to 
the date of the hearing before the IJ does not mean that Ouadah received them before the 
hearing.  There is no evidence in the record to support this proposition.  At present, it is 
conjecture.  Further, Ouadah did not provide any explanation for the failure to present 
these affidavits to the BIA.  Rather, as the BIA notes, no explanation for why the 
evidence was previously unavailable was offered.  This conclusion is not “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”   
 It is the applicant‟s burden to demonstrate that the evidence was previously 
  
7 
unavailable, and the burden is a heavy one.  Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110.  Ouadah failed to 
satisfy that burden.  Offering conjectural explanations now is insufficient; Ouadah should 
have provided an explanation to the BIA.  He did not.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
BIA.
6
   
V.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, this Court will affirm the BIA‟s decision denying 
Ouadah‟s motion to remand.7 
  
                                                 
6
  Ouadah argues that he has established a prima facie claim for relief.  Since the three 
grounds listed above are independent of each other, Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104, the BIA can 
base its grant or denial of a motion to reopen on any one of them.  In this case, the BIA 
based its decision on the second ground — the failure to provide previously unavailable 
material evidence.  Therefore, this Court need not discuss the first ground, as Ouadah 
does.  These factors are not conjunctive.  The BIA has the option of choosing the basis 
for its decision.  Id. at 105-6 (“[T]he BIA has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even 
if the alien has made out a prima facie case for relief.”). 
 
7
  In passing, Ouadah mentions that the BIA “denied [him] due process by failing to 
remand this matter for further proceedings.”  (Br. of the Pet‟r 2.)  On two other occasions, 
Ouadah mentions a potential due process claim in his brief.  (Id. at 21, 26.)  These three 
references, without more, fail to set forth that claim before this Court.  See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An appellant‟s brief must contain his or 
her argument, which must incorporate „appellant‟s contentions and the reasons for them, 
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies. . . .‟” 
(quoting FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A)); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 
1066 (3d Cir. 1991) (plurality opinion) (“Under the specificity requirements of Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 and Third Circuit Rule 21, a passing reference to an issue 
in a brief will not suffice to bring that issue before this court on appeal.”).  Lacking any 
factual or legal support or explanation for Ouadah‟s contention that the BIA‟s decision 
violated his due process rights, we conclude that this argument is waived.  
